[tcs-lc] Is nomenclatural type assingment taxonomic/concept based

[Richard Pyle]

> Nico wrote:
>
> "I have a few questions. Do this Objective/Subjective distinction
> help us? Is
> it feasible and desirable to have one schema handle some name
> relationships
> (homotypic ones) that are prescribed in the Codes but not others
> (heterotypic
> situations)? And what about the long list of
> [para/iso/ex/plasto/epi/lecto/...]
> typifications which clearly reflect taxonomic judgment?"
>
> Gregor: Can you elaborate that? I think I disagree. Like almost any
> nomenclatural statement, some judgement (knowledge of true
> publication dates,
> rules of nomenclature and assessement whether these are followed
> is involved. I
> believe that assessing the kind of type that a specimen is in
> relation to a
> nomenclatural name falls into the same category. This category in
> my think is
> very different from heterotypic synonmyization based on the
> opinions about the
> extent of a taxon circumscription concept.

Yes, it's true that there will always be some subjectivity in applying the
Code rules of nomenclature to actual situations (publication dates,
prevailing usages, word forms, etc., etc.).  But I don't *think* that's what
Nico was refering to.  I think he meant subjective assertions about
circumscription boundaries.

I believe that "Scientific Names" exist as abstract objects.  Codes of
nomenclature establish rules that apply to these abstract objects. Most of
those rules have to do with the interaction of "name objects" with
"publication objects", "agent objects", and "primary type objects". These
"name objects" are usually represented in the form of character strings, but
the character strings themselves do not *define* the name objects.  For
example, no nomenclaturalist that I know would consider "Aus bea" and "Aus
beus" (the only difference being the gender matching of the species epithet
with the genus epithet) as different "name objects", even though they
consist of different strings of text characters.

Properties of name objects include a wide assortment of things, ranging from
authorships and references to publication objects, to latin grammar issues
and typification acts. Except for the typification acts (and maybe a few
other cases), these properties have no relevance to any actual physical
organism other than the primary types -- and therefore have little impact on
concept circumscriptions. These are what I think of when Nico references
"objective" taxonomic information.

Individual organisms exist in the real world as physical objects. Concept
circumscritpions are defined sets of these individual organisms, and extend
well beyond the scope of specimens examined by whoever defined the concept.
In a sense they are abstract, but not as abstract as name objects (which
really have no physical manifestation at all, except perhaps an original
publication document).

Properties of concept objects involve defining the size/shape/position of
the "circle" that circumscribes a set of organisms into one concept.  These
are what I think of when Nico references "subjective" taxonomic information.

A scientific name object gets applied to a concept circumscription via
primary type specimens.  As I have said several times before, the primary
type specimen is really the only area where information relevant to name
objects intersects with information relevant to concept circumscriptions.
When more than one specimen that has been designated as a primary type of a
name is included within a concept circumscription, there are rules of
priority to determine which name should properly be applied to the concept.

There is no doubt, as Paul has said, that the concept preceeds the name.
Accordingly, there is no doubt that for every name that is intended to be
established in accordance with the Codes of nomenclature, there is an
implied concept circumscription of organisms beyond the type specimen of the
name.  For this reason (among others), I tend to agree with the TCS
developers that Names are best represented as embedded within concept
instances (despite my hypothetical thought experiment). HOWEVER, where we
differ is on the value of "force-fitting" (as I would characterize it) of
name-name relationships and concept-concept relationships within the exact
same set of elements of the schema.

As for Nico's question about other kinds of types, only the ones that are
"name-bearing" (Holo-, Lecto-, Neo-, etc.) are properties of name objects.
The others (Para-, Paralecto-, Allo-, etc.) are landmarks for establishing
concept circumscriptions.

Nico later wrote:

>    An act of lectotypification, for example, requires that someone makes
> a judgment about the identity of the original type specimen /in relation
> to/ the one that is then assigned lectotype status.

Not really.  By definition, a lectotype was examined by the person who
established the name, and included by that person within the circumscription
they had in mind when establishing the name.  So pretty-much by definition,
a true lectotypification event requires no subjective interpretation --
other than the inference that the candidate lectotype was indeed examined by
the original describer, and indeed considered *by that person* as among the
matieral representative of the taxon.  This is different from a
neotypification event, where the neotype was *not* among the specimens
available to the original describer.  Indeed, the neotype designation *does*
require subjective interpretation about concept circumscriptions when
typified.  But as I have said, the domain of the primary type designation is
where there is intermingling of name-objects and concept circumscriptions.

In either case (neotype or lectotype), the act of typification fixes the
name to a specific specimen, and thereafter serves the same role as a
holotype.  The person who establishes the neotype or lectotype is under a
"moral" obligation to the original describer to do his/her best to ensure
that the new type specimen is selected from among those that were (or would
have been) included within the original describer's concept circumscription;
but this is not really an issue about defining the size or shape of any
concept circumscription "circle" (though it does arguably have an impact on
the "position" of the circle).

> I thought this kind
> of comparative study of specimens might have a different quality than
> pure literature assessments (e.g. nomen nudum). Whenever there are
> judgments involving at least one name and two or more specimens I
> understand these assessments to be "subjective" in the ICZN sense. And
> "subjective" suggests that a concept approach is justified.

I think the distinction is less about ICZN rules or even so much the
"objective" vs. Subjective distinction.  To me, the real question is whether
the infromation applies to the size/shape/position of a circumscription
(inclusive of more than the primary type specimen) -- making it a property
of a concept circumscription; or whether the information applies to the
formulation of the names, and the relative priority of two potentially
competing names (among other nomenclatural situations).

>    My main point was that it is not trivial to go through all the terms
> and acts prescribed by the Codes and make such objective/subjective
> distinctions. A first personal attempt to do this is attached as a
> spreadsheet.

Did you get my version of this file with the "Applies To" column appended?
I went through your list and assigned each row accordingly.  Let me know if
you didn't receive a copy of this, or if you have any questions or concerns
about my assignement.

>    I was meaning to say that, practicality issues aside (see the
> Jessie-Rich-Sally-Roger-Gregor etc. threads), there are valid
> first-principle arguments for looking at the Codes as prescribing
> "Concepts Light" in numerous cases. In my view the "new typification
> acts" fall into this category.

I agree for neotypes, but not ncessarily lectotypes.  And, as I have said
repeatedly, the act of typification is really the only domain that both
objects (names and concepts) can legitimately claim as their own.

> Quoting ICZN (p. 83): "Recommendation
> 74A. Agreement with previous restriction. In designating a lectotype, in
> order to preserve stability of nomenclature an author should act
> consistently with, and in any event should give great weight to,
> previously accepted taxonomic restrictions of the application of
> the name."

Recommendations are not rules.  In fact, I think the main reason that ICZN
provides recommendations (instead of Articles) is for cases that involve
subjective interpretations of concept circumscriptions.

>    If it turns out that some "Code-prescribed acts" are open to (or even
> require) such a conceptual reading, how do we treat them in the TCS-LC
> context?

In the case of neotypes they do -- but only as a way to help foster
nomenclatural stability.  Once a neotype designation is made, the connection
between a name object and the biological world is fixed.

But the point is, it is fixed only in one-dimentional space (a single
specimen).  Concepts are an issue of two-dimentional space (circles).
Actually, concepts are three-dimentional, when you recognize them as
applying to sets of organisms that exist over many generations (=time).  But
names are always (or should always be) fixed to a single specimen.

Rich